Jonathan B. Wilson

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Thursday, June 30, 2005

Compensation and Responbility
On PointOfLaw: Should a plaintiff's compensation be based on his personal, subjective valuation of the thing lossed.  Or, should compensation be based upon objective (i.e., marketplace) factors?
7:34 am est

Watching for Rehnquist's Resignation
Speculation continues that Chief Justice William Rehnquist will resign before the Fall. 
6:15 am est

Wednesday, June 29, 2005

How Ireland Got Rich
Thomas Friedman explains how Ireland went from last to first. 
12:50 pm est

Thank You
To ProfessorBainbridge for this mention; and
 
To Kevin Thompson for adding this site to his blogroll on CyberLawCentral.
12:35 pm est

Punch and CounterPunch - Redux
Follow the continuation of my debate with Clay Conrad on PointofLaw
 
12:13 pm est

Tuesday, June 28, 2005

What Would Eric Cartman Do?
James Taranto recently poked fun at North Carolina Governor Mike Easley for having his pollster separate respondents into those who did, or did not, watch the adult comic television show "King of the Hill".
 
In doing so, Taranto mused that "South Park conservatives don't sit around trying to figure out what Eric Cartman's position would be on tort reform . . ."
 
This is true . . . because we already know he favors tort reform.
 
In the 1999 episode "Sexual Harassment Panda", after a classroom presentation by the Sexual Harassment Panda warned against the evils of sexual harassment and the risk of extortionate lawsuits, Eric Cartman sued his young friend Stan Marsh, winning a jury verdict of "all of Stan's toys". 
 
The plot exacted an ironic toll, however, and the tables were soon turned as one of the boys won a countersuit against Cartman.  The whole town, including Cartman, then learned its lesson in the suit of "Everybody vs. Everybody" (where Kyle's trial lawyer father, interestingly, represented both the plaintiffs and the defendants).
 
This brought Cartman and the boys to search out the Sexual Harassment Panda at the "Island of Misfit Mascots Commune" where they convinced him to change his name to Petey "the don't sue people" Panda.
 
If only Taranto did his research . . . .
 
cartman.JPG
12:16 pm est

Possible Milberg Weiss Indictment
Legal bloggers speculating on a possible indictment of Milberg Weiss on the heels on an indictment of one of its clients include Bainbridge, Ribstein and Henning
 
The practices that Lazar is alleged to have engaged in are certainly dastardly.  The principle of class action litigation is that the interests of many are adequately represented by a few named plaintiffs, allowing for a more efficient outcome than if each individual plaintiff were left to pursue his own remedies. 
 
That principle is utterly undone if, as alleged, the named plaintiff has a covert arrangment with class counsel for additional compensation that is not shared with other class members.
 
The practice is especially dastardly because the mechanics of litigation (with the protection of the attorney/client relationship) cloak the transactions between the named plaintiff and class counsel.  There is no third party to regulate those transactions and no mechanism to police wrongdoing.
 
While judges have a responsibility to avoid collusive arrangements with class counsel and collusive settlements, in practice many judges lack the inclination and the legal tools to supervise these arrangements.
 
While defendants may sometimes suspect inappropriate behavior, they too lack a mechanism to prevent it and may even lack the standing to complain about it.
 
Some commentators, like Ribstein, suggest that the defense bar should not be too gleeful to cheer on the prosecutors.  The criminal law is a particularly blunt instrument and its use to indict an entire firm for the misdeeds of a few can have repercussions that extend far beyond the present case.  (The example of Arthur Andersen is easy to see). 
 
Ribstein suggests that, as an alternative to prosecution, "legislative reforms should be viewed as an alternative to the criminal law in fixing whatever is wrong with corporations."
 
This advice is well taken and the arguments of those who have cautioned against "legislation through litigation" apply equally well to this topic.
 
In fact, the prevalence of the kind of wrongdoing alleged in the Lazar case suggests that Congress has been remiss in not reforming the class action laws. 
6:34 am est

Monday, June 27, 2005

Focus on Luttig and Roberts
Today's Chicago Tribune reports: 
A senior Bush administration official told the Tribune that top officials in the administration have interviewed leading contenders, including, in recent weeks, Roberts. Sources close to the White House said Friday that senior administration officials are focusing most closely on Luttig and Roberts, although no decision has been made.
Tom Goldstein cautions not to read too much into the articles mention of recent interviews with Roberts.  He reasons that other contenders could have been interviewed long ago whereas the interest in Roberts is relatively recent, dating to his recent appointment to the D.C. Circuit. 
 
Update (10:55am): RealClearPolitics is also reporting an "informal poll" of Supreme Court watchers producing a list of likely nominees with Luttig and Roberts at the top. 
7:56 am est

Client of Milberg Weiss Indicted
According to the NY Times, a federal grand jury in Los Angeles has indicted 78-year-old Palm Springs lawyer, Seymour M. Lazar, for allegedly receiving at least $2.4 million in kickbacks from prominent plaintiffs' law firm Milberg Weiss.
 
Walter Olson has more on background. 
 
Update (1:40pm): Martin Grace notes the irony that some plaintiffs' lawyers are worrying about the chilling effect an investigation of Millberg Weiss might have. 
7:48 am est

Sunday, June 26, 2005

A Looming GOP Rift Over Judicial Nominees?
The Boston Globe reports on what it calls a "rift" among conservatives over possible Supreme Court nominees:
As liberals and conservatives gear up for a multimillion-dollar battle over a potential Supreme Court vacancy, a growing divide on the right threatens the unity of President Bush's coalition: Conservative legal scholars want their evangelical allies to keep quiet and take a back seat in any nomination battle.
 
Evangelical attacks on judges over the Terri Schiavo feeding tube case backfired on Republicans, polls taken in the spring indicated. Now, many conservatives fear the religious right could hurt the party's cause by using faith-based arguments about abortion, same-sex marriage, and the separation of church and state to promote a Supreme Court nominee.
 
Instead, many Republican lawyers with close ties to the White House are determined to present such a nominee to the country in the religiously neutral terms Bush used in last year's campaign: as a judge who ''knows the difference between personal opinion and strict interpretation of the law."
 
''We should be looking for outstanding jurists, not ministers," said Victoria Toensing, a Justice Department official in the Reagan administration.
This angle, however, confuses spin for a "rift".  Of course conservatives will want to present a conservative nominee in terms that are the most "marketable" to the broadest audience.  Presenting a nominee as a dyed-in-the-wool evangelical would alienate some voters.
 
Balancing the presentation between terms that will energize the Republican base and terms that will avoid alienating the opposition base will be a marketing feat.  But it is an effort in mass communications, not a signal of disunity on the conservative side of the aisle. 
7:04 am est

Supreme Court Nominees Backgrounder on Slate
Added to the Resources column on the Supreme Court Short List.
6:55 am est

Saturday, June 25, 2005

Punch and CounterPunch
Don't miss the extended debate with Clay Conrad on PointOfLaw
7:08 am est

A Scenario for Monday
Lyle Denniston has an excellent description of the Supreme Court's end-of-term tradition and some suggestions on when the announcement of a resignation might occur. 
7:07 am est

Kristol Predicts O,Connor, not Rehnquist, Will Step Down
Here's his piece.
 
The blogosphere reacts: Howard Kurtz, RightWingNews,
 
Hugh Hewitt's radio interview with Kristol discussions reactions and rationales.  (Hat tip: Radioblogger).   
 
More background on the Supreme Court Short List
6:31 am est

Friday, June 24, 2005

Consulting on Supreme Court Nominations
Senate Democrats are asking the White House to consult with them on any potential Supreme Court nominee: 
"The way to avoid the divisiveness and discord that occurred over past judicial nominations is through consensus and cooperation in the selection of future candidates," the Senate Democrats said in a letter sent to the White House Thursday.
This message of bi-partisan compromise and conciliation is utterly inconsistent, however, with the actions of Senate Democrats, however, shown by the example of Senator Kennedy have already "ruled out" Clarence Thomas and other judges as nominees for advancement. 
 
For more, check out the Supreme Court Short List resource page. 
9:52 am est

CounterPunch on Tort Reform
Tort reform nemesis Clay Conrad publishes a piece on CounterPunch that re-hashes many of the arguments he made in our recent exchanges on the subject of tort reform versus juries (summary and my reply here). 
 
I like Conrad's writing because it is clear and well-researched even though I disagree with his conclusions.  I also appreciate the way he keeps the debate on the merits, rather than devolving into class warfare and personal invective.
 
But I can't help concluding that his primary argument (legal reformers have a secret, primary purpose which is to eliminate civil juries) just isn't persuasive. 
 
Conrad is a worthy debater, however, and I'll try to extend this thesis in other posts shortly.
 
 
6:53 am est

Kelo v. New London: Supreme Court Eminent Domain
In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court in Kelo v. New London upheld the city of New London's ability to condemn private property for the purpose of a private re-development of that property.
 
Property rights groups are predictability upset and the blogosphere is humming (Ted Frank, SCOTUSblog, and Volokh). 
 
So much is noteworthy that it's hard to know where to begin, but a few preliminary comments may help:
 
1. Ted Frank's concern that Justice Kennedy is introducing a  brand-new test that "is so amorphous to be effectively standardless, requiring case-by-case adjudication, thus effectively transforming the judicial branch into a super-legislature with the power to veto condemnations engaged in by the executive branch . . ." is right on the money. 
 
It also guarantees that the appellate courts will see an increasing number of appeals of eminent domain decisions as unhappy property owners will be able to take a shot at reversel based upon Justice Kennedy's new "favoritism" rationale.

2. Orin Kerr and others have properly identified Justice Thomas' dissent as a model of elegance. 

Nicole Garnett persuasively aruges that Thomas identifies a key political element of the majority's decision: eminent domain of the kind involved in this case pits the politically powerful against the politically powerless.  By arguing the rights of property owners, Thomas is in fact arguing the case of the "little guy".

6:42 am est

Thursday, June 23, 2005

The Hidden Cost of Prosecuting Corporate Decision-Making
Professor Bainbridge has a provocative piece on the hidden downside to criminalizing corporate wrongdoing. 
 
He argues that making anything other than blatant theft punishable as a crime chills corporate decision-making.  He writes:
In sum, shareholders deserve protection from theft, but not from risk taking, even when the risk in question is how much to pay an executive. Unfortunately, it's not clear that prosecutors know the difference -- or even care.
In other words, if the corporate executive worries that potentially risky decision-making might result in a threatened prosecution, the executive will make few or no risky decisions.  In the long run, this ultra-conservative behavior will hurt shareholders because corporations will avoid taking potentially profitable courses of action because of the fear of risk.
 
Professor Larry Ribstein also suggests that many of these prosecutions of corporate decision-making are motivated more by class warfare and the desire of prosecutors to "bludgeon" corporations into tying the line than they are really about prosecuting crime. 
 
 
6:01 am est

Wednesday, June 22, 2005

Attack of the Radio Waves
A report from the American Council on Science and Health unearths the story of a family in California who has nailed sheet metal to their house in order to ward off radio waves.  It seems the family, including two college-educated daughters, believe that their neighbors are sending radio waves in their direction which they believe to be a health hazard.
 
The ACSH reminds us that it was not that long ago when some activists claimed that radio waves were harmful.  Hundreds of lawsuits ensued until science finally caught up with the headlines: there was no link between radio waves and health hazards of any kind.
 
Why do attention-grabbing headlines persist when there is no scientific basis for alarm?  The article concludes:
Just as sensationalist journalists pursue the most lurid tales of freakish behavior or bloodshed, some researchers willfully subvert science to achieve a headline-grabbing statistic, preferably with the most terrifying number possible. By establishing a dire threat, these mercenaries can attract funding for still more research.
This would be nothing more than an interesting sidelight to a human interest story if it weren't for the real economic impacts that this kind of reaction has:
As far back as 1994, Congress's General Accounting Office estimated the needless expenditures on electromagnetic field protections had already surpassed $1 billion. Power companies, municipalities, and school systems spend millions rerouting cables, installing shielding, or burying power lines. Rather than confront the public with facts, and rather than risk jackpot awards in frivolous lawsuits, utilities often just roll over and squander money on expensive measures unsupported by science.
5:52 am est

Tuesday, June 21, 2005

Complexity
Everyone likes to report back to their parents on occasion, even when they've graduated into adulthood, reliving those childhood memories of bringing home report cards to the smiles of Mom and Dad.
 
For lawyers whose parents are not attorneys this can sometimes be frustrating, as non-legal Moms and Dads sometimes don't appreciate the importance of things we lawyers think matter.  Even our attempts at humor can sometimes fall flat (i.e., "You can always tell an agressive patent lawyer; he's the one who looks at your shoes when we speaks to you . . . .").
 
Lawyers have nothing, however, in comparison to those children who grow up to be polymer chemists.  This point was brought home to me by my sister (Kristen S. Wilson, PhD) when she shared with me her recent paper, "Polydimethylsiloxane-magnetite nanoparticle complexes and dispersions in polysiloxane carrier fluids". 
 
I have no idea what my sister is talking about, but then neither do our parents.
1:22 pm est

Supreme Court Short List
If you've noticed the new link on the left nav bar you're already aware that I'm building a database of information and links to a number of possible nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court.
 
There is no vacancy to be filled as yet, of course, but it seemed to serve a helpful purpose to the blogosphere to pull together some useful information before a vacancy develops.
 
The Supreme Court Short List is not yet finished.  In fact its still pretty threadbare in places.  I'll be filling in the gaps over the next few days.
 
If you'd like to add something to the list, or have additional resources you'd like me to link, please drop me a line at jbw at jonathanbwilson.com
6:45 am est

DMCA Notice-and-Takedown Provisions
Blogger Ernest Miller has a problem with the notice-and-takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
We should not use unjust laws, giving them legitimacy, unless there are no reasonable alternatives. In this case, there are a number of alternatives, such as sending a polite request, sending a threatening legal letter, contacting the ISP directly, or even suing for copyright infringement (statutory damages are your friend).
Kevin Thompson responds with an excellent summary of the notice-and-takedown provisions, describing the procedures required to send a valid notice and the ISP's obligations in responding.
 
If you're an attorney and have clients with copyright interests to protect on the Web, you need to be familiar with the DMCA.
 
It's not clear why Miller describes the DMCA as an "unjust law" although I agree with him that an infringed party's first step should ordinarily be a polite request or even a cease and desist letter.
 
What's important to note, however, is one of the rationales for the notice-and-takedown provisions is to create a "safe harbor" for ISPs. 
 
Before the DMCA, ISPs were often the victim of infringement suits based upon the actions of their customers.  Although ISPs had little practical ability to prevent their customers from infringing copyrights, under traditional copyright infringement analysis they were just as liable as their customer.
 
The DMCA changed the law, making it possible for ISPs and Web hosts to develop as an industry, by creating a bright line test.  If the ISP followed the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA it could not be sued by the copyright owner.  (The copyright owner retained the right to sue the ISP's customer, who was responsible for the infringement). 
 
Those who have problems with the DMCA's lack of procedural safeguards for free speech should address their concerns through an amendment of the DMCA, but without upsetting the ISP safe harbor.  The safe harbor has eliminated the threat of litigation to a significant industry that makes cheap and easy Web access possible.  Eliminating the safe harbor would be a substantial setback to the cause of efficiency on the Web. 
 
 
6:36 am est

Monday, June 20, 2005

Confusion Reigns Supreme
Writing on legal topics is difficult.  You need to check your facts and make sure you understand both the facts and the law before you commit pen to paper (or mouse to screen).
 
Popular writers rarely get it right and when they fail, they fail spectacularly.
 
Today's spectacular failure comes from Terry Collins, writing in the River Valley Business Report on June 20, 2005.  (The date is important as you'll see in a minute).
 
Collins criticizes President Bush for advocating tort reform, noting that Bush favors caps on malpractice claims and "federalizing" class action lawsuits even though "studies indicate there is no 'tort crisis.'"
 
Collins' first point is that malpractice caps won't matter much in Wisconsin, because Wisconsin already has caps: 
While both measures are perceived as good news for business owners worried about liability costs, limitations on medical malpractice lawsuits will change little in Wisconsin because the state in recent years already has enacted its own laws imposing limits. The president's proposals would create federal laws that track with some that we already have in Wisconsin.
Setting aside the important legal consideration that federal caps on damages (even if they were mathematically redundant with state caps) could have a significant impact on the way cases are actually litigated, Collins then lets loose this howler:
Other professions are not protected by damage caps, as are health-care providers.  Typically, claims against other professionals do not have a large non-economic component and therefore limits have not been deemed necessary.
Really, Terry?  That's good to know.  I'll be sure to pass it on to all the businesses that have ever been tagged with a punitive damages award in excess of $100 million. 
 
Collins then turns his attention to Bush's proposal for reforming class actions:
Federalizing class-action lawsuits, on the other hand, may hold changes for Wisconsin businesses.  . . . While details of the proposed law are unknown at this time, most expect it will vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts and prevent state court filings. It would not be surprising if the law also includes restrictions on when class-action suits may be filed.  (emphasis added). 
Apparently the snow hadn't thawed in Wisconsin in time for its business writers to read about the Class Action Fairness Act passed Congress and was signed by the President on February 18, 2005. 
 
How many lay readers in the River Valley of Wisconsin will read Collins' article and believe that the details of Bush's proposed class action reform "are not known at this time?"
6:09 am est

Regulation Changes Behavior
Christine Hurt has an interesting piece on how broker behavior has changed in light of Regulation AC. 
5:41 am est

Sunday, June 19, 2005

The Next Supreme Court Justice?
Could Michael Luttig be next in line?
 
luttig_michael1.jpg
10:09 am est

Saturday, June 18, 2005

California Supreme Court Struggles with Punitive Damages
The California Supreme Court issued two opinions last week (Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., and Lionel Simon v. San Paulo U.S. Holding Company, Inc.) applying the U.S. Supreme Court's rules limiting punitive damages from State Farm v. Campbell.
 
I have an extended post on PointofLaw, but in summary I think the cases will be hard to reconcile and will lead to further confusion and litigation. 
 
What would reduce the confusion is one of the two recommendations I make in Out of Balance: a statutory cap on punitive damages based upon a ratio with compensatory damages. 
 
Under State Farm v. Campbell, there is a Constitutional limitation on punitive damages based upon a number of factors including the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.  Drawing an arbitrary, but legislatively-mandated line rule, would improve certainty, finality and efficiency in litigating cases with punitive damages. 
2:42 pm est

Friday, June 17, 2005

The Meaning of Judicial Activism
John Dean (yes, that John Dean) has a thought provoking piece on the meaning of judicial activism.  He cites a number of examples from the left and the right to support he central thesis that the word is (to quote Antonin Scalia) "just fluff."
 
Dean cites a 2004 law review comment by Keenan Kmiec entitled, "The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism"".  Kmiec's piece traces the usage of the word from 1947 to the present day.
 
Dean's conclusion is that politicians and policy makers should be far more precise when they talk about the judiciary.  Judicial activism should not just mean "judges behaving badly".
 
The age and composition of the Supreme Court suggest that we will all have a lot to say about judges in the relatively near future.  We would all be well advised to take Dean's suggestions to heart. 
6:47 am est

PointOfLaw Today
A new ADA reform bill would impose a 90-day notice period before filing suit.
 
A flood of securities class action settlements in the past few weeks will bring in a bumper crop of contingent fees for Bill Lerach & Friends. 
6:17 am est

Thursday, June 16, 2005

Out of Balance - Update
Out of Balance is now available through Amazon and Barnes & Noble.
12:30 pm est

Tort Reform Criticism
Clay Conrad, writing at JuryGeek, has written two extended pieces (June 9, June 11) on tort reform and the institution of the civil jury.
 
Conrad's central argument seems to be that "tort reformers" are secretly engaged in an effort to eliminate civil juries and are dishonestly using the problem of excessive litigation to reach their true, but hidden goal:
The tort reform battles have not yet exhausted themselves. It is important, however, to recognize them for what they are: a smokescreen for an attack on the jury system. And a dishonest attack, at that.
Conrad's arguments fall short on several levels.
 
First, he falls prey to the linguistic error that seems common among trial lawyer advocates who lump everyone who advocates some kind of civil justice reform into the monolithic "tort reformers".  There is a wide variety of opinion among reform advocates.  We don't all agree amongst ourselves.  Consequently, to suggest that everyone who advocates reform is secretly united in a cabal to eliminate jury trials is simply false.
 
Second, although he cites Punitive Damages, How Juries Decide, as an exemplar of jury criticism, he dismisses its arguments by citing a contrary work.   
 
What the authors of that book (Viscusi, in particular) demonstrate is that there is no rational connection between the evidence involved in punitive damages cases and the punitive damages awarded by juries.  A later study by Viscusi demonstrated that, inappositely, juries were more likely to punish responsible corporate decision-making (i.e. trade-offs between cost and safety) than they were to reward it.
 
Thus, he concluded, if the goal of punitive damages is to deter unsafe and reckless conduct, jury-awarded punitive damages actually undercut that goal. 
 
Conrad does not address this theme.
 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Conrad claims that "tort reform bills that have either passed or been suggested have nothing to do with reining in lawsuit abuse."
They deal with reducing damage awards in cases with actual, bona fide victims. I would suggest this is because the corporate sponsors of tort reform are more concerned with the awards they have to pay their REAL victims than they are with the costs of frivolous litigation.

If the latter was the concern, a loser-pay system would be their goal, or at least a system to require plaintiffs or their counsel to reimburse defendants if the litigation is dismissed as frivolous. We aren't hearing many cries for those sorts of reforms.
Conrad needs to widen his reading horizons.
 
Walter Olson has been writing about loser-pays for more than a decade.
 
My book, Out of Balance, Prescriptions for Reforming the American Litigation System, spends a great deal of time explaining why fee-shifting offer of judgment rules will do much to reduce frivolous litigation and more efficiently resolve meritworthy cases.
 
Are proposals like these taken seriously by legislatures?
 
Just a few months ago, my home state of Georgia adopted a fee-shifting offer of judgment rule.
 
There are a great many reform advocates who take aim at the real economic problem of excessive litigation.  Those who criticizes juries have legitimate reasons to do so.  Conrad's approach fails to account for legitimate jury criticism and those reforms that truly speak to procedural improvement.
6:31 am est

Wednesday, June 15, 2005

Texas Silicosis Antics
The ordinarily pro-plaintiff Atlanta Journal Constitution has let slip through a piece by a local freelance writer on the "sleazy" practices of some plaintiffs' lawyers in a silicosis case in the Southern District of Texas. 
 
As Ted Frank noted in several posts on PointofLaw (Feb. 17, Feb. 27, and March 21) the case had generated a lot of publicity, including its own website
 
Atlanta writer Luke Boggs quotes the presiding judge, Janis Graham Jack, saying, "this case is more about fraud and money than it is about criminal liability."
 
After hearing several days of testimony on the admissibility of plaintiffs' proposed experts, Judge Jack declared that the facts raised "great red flags of fraud"  because nearly half of the 10,000 plaintiffs involved in the case claimed to have silicosis even though they had previously claimed in other litigation to have asbestosis.
 
Medical experts testified that it was "extremely rare" to have both conditions in a patient.  On cross-examination, many of the plaintiffs' proposed expert witnesses reneged on their diagnoses.
9:58 am est

Pigs in California
A case brought by animal rights activitists in California will test the effects of Proposition 64. 
 
The activists are suing a pork producer over conditions on the producer's farm, including the size and type of cages used for the animals.  Among the activists' causes of action are claims under California's notorious Unfair Competition Law 17200.
 
California voters in November 2004, through Proposition 64, amended that law to re-impose a traditional notion of standing, preventing parties from suing under the law unless they had a legal interest in the case.
 
The pork-producing defendant in this case claims that the activists have no standing to challenge the animal's living conditions because they are not affected by those conditions.
6:42 am est

Public Companies Going Private to Flee Sarbanes-Oxley

In reaction to the expense, hassle and administrative burden of complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other increased regulatory requirements facing public companies, increasing numbers of public companies are "going private" in leveraged buyouts. 

6:24 am est

Barratry in Pennsylvania
On PointOfLaw, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania charge a serial litigant with barratry for filing 24 lawsuits against county officials over ten years. 
6:22 am est

Tuesday, June 14, 2005

Employment at Will vs. Self-Defense
Walter Olson, writing on PointOfLaw, highlights an interesting debate stirred up by a recent decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court.
 
David Kopel recounts the case of Feliciano v. Seven-Eleven in which Feliciano was terminated by Southland Corp. (the owner of the 7/11 store) for disarming and holding for police an armed assailant who tried to rob the 7/11 store where he worked.  Southland had a policy that prohibited its employees from trying to disarm assailants and that required employees to respond passively.
 
The West Virginia Supreme Court held it was wrongful for Southland to have terminated Feliciano and that Feliciano's right to self-defense trumped Southland's right to create rules of employment and workplace behavior.  Notwithstanding Feliciano's status as an at-will employee, Southland could not terminate Feliciano for exercise his right to self-defense.
 
In addition to Kopel's praise for the ruling, Glenn Reynolds also notes this holding approvingly. 
 
Stephen Bainbridge, however, argues that this "is yet another judicial blow against freedom of contract and private property rights."  He notes that judicial exceptions to the law of employment at will have a number of negative consequences, including practical impacts (increased cost of hiring and restrained job opportunities) and the theoretical (a decrease in freedom to contract).
 
While I have a gutteral reaction to the story of a convenience store employee who heroically disarms a robber, I can also empathize with the employer who tries to enforce its rules of employment.
 
It's easy to side with the right of self-defense when everything turns out well, but what if Feliciano's act of bravery had failed?  If the assailant had then killed or injured the store's employees or patrons it is virtually inevitable that one or more of those killed or injured would have sued the store owner.
 
The store owner would have defended against the claim on a number of fronts, including by arguing that the employee's attempt at disarmament was ultra vires and prohibited by the employer's rules.  If the plaintiffs could point to past examples where the employer had declined to enforce its rules against self-defense, the defendant might have been deprived of this potential defense.
 
In short, if employers are to be liable for hazardous conditions on their premises and for the actions of their employees, employers must be free to impose and enforce workplace rules, even if those workplace rules infringe on other rights, including the right of self-defense. 
6:58 am est

Monday, June 13, 2005

Fourth Amendment Puzzle
Although I generally write on civil litigation problems, I couldn't help noticing this interesting piece by Orin Kerr.  Because electronic discovery is increasingly important in civil litigation, the treatment of these problems in criminal litigation is noteworthy.
 
As I understand it, the question is whether the government has the right to review an imaged copy of a computer hard drive (which it obtained with the consent of the computer owner) after the computer owner has revoked his consent.
 
Kerr suggests that the government would not have the right.  In the same way that the government would have to cease a search of a residence after the owner revoked consent, the government must cease its search of a copy after consent is revoked.
 
One way to resolve this conundrum, however, is to ask when was the consent revoked. 
 
Imagine, in Example #1 where the computer owner revoked his consent after the copy was made and after that copy was reviewed.  In that situation, the revocation would be too late.  The government could permissibly use what it learned during the search of the copy.
 
In Example #2, the computer owner revokes his consent after the copy was made, but before the copy was reviewed.  Kerr suggests that the government may not review the copy.
 
If the law was as Kerr suggests, wouldn't that give the government a powerful incentive to search every imaged hard drive as quickly as possible after the copy was made simply to avoid the possibility that the owner might revoke consent? 
 
Making the revocation effective to deprive the government of the ability to review the copy makes it possible for the government to review the evidence today, but not review it the moment after the consent is revoked.
 
This would seem to result in an absurd result. 
 
To complicate matters further, it's not clear what would suffice as a search.  If the government performed an electronic search for certain files before consent was revoked, would the government have the ability to follow up on that search after consent was revoked?  Would the government be prohibited from conducting different kinds of searches thereafter?  Or, would the conduct of a single search pre-revocation open the door to any further kind of search post-revocation?
 
 
But then again, that's why I don't practice in this area. 
11:40 am est

The More Things Change
 . . . the more they stay the same.
 
Senate Democrats are still filibustering administration nominees.  They're dressing up their actions, however, in the cloak of "more information". 
11:32 am est

Inmate Suit Scam
Convicted felons filing frivolous suits from prison . . .get the details from PointOfLaw.com
11:30 am est

Saturday, June 11, 2005

Gun Fight at the Enid Corral
I thought that my recent post on the letter to the editor of the Enid News would soon be forgotten, never to be spoken of again on the peaceful streets of Enid, Oklahoma. 
 
I was wrong.
 
Into the fray steps Alfred Rosenbaum (scroll to bottom of link):
Your response to the article was an absurdity. Apparently, you failed to read the gist of the article, or knowingly chose to attack what you saw as distortions in the article rather than addressing its substantive points. As the article attempted to relate,what "serious proponents" of tort reform believe is truly unimportant versus public opinion as a whole, which serves as the major impetus behind the "reformist" movement. The fact is that the majority of people probably believe these urban legends to be true, and your side is of course reluctant to debunk such theories.
 
A more appropriate response, rather than flippantly discarding the article as "silly", would have been to address why the substantive points of the article were incorrect, namely the role of insurance companies using litigation as an excuse to raise rates on individuals. I think it would be further appropriate for you to disclose the amount of money that is contributed to you, your cause, and your website by insurance corporations. Perhaps you could conclude your disclosure with an addendum that would explain to a single mother why the value of her limbs, were they to be amputated through an unfortunate course of negligent events, would only be worth $250,000. "
Well, Al, as they say in Oklahoma, "them's fightin' words."
 
On the first point, that I failed to address the "substantive points" of the article, I think I stand acquitted. 
 
My argument was that the author was disingenuous by "debunking" an e-mail hoax that had long been debunked. 
 
It is an old trick to knock down a straw man argument.  There are no serious reform advocates that hold out the "Stella Award" cases as true.  Hence, it is illogical to suggest that "refuting" those cases serves any point at all.
 
Mr. Rosenbaum does not dispute that "serious proponents" of tort reform know better than to believe the Stella Award cases.  Rather, he suggests that "the majority of people probably believe these urban legends to be true." 
 
I'll ask the judge for a ruling on this one . . . . Sorry, Al, no dice. 
 
Without some poll results to document this claim, I must disagree that "the majority of people" believe these urban legends to be true.  Even if there were some collection of Americans who do believe these hoaxes, does that really matter?
 
A 2002 study by the National Science Foundation found that nearly 50% of those surveyed believed that human beings lived on the Earth at the same time as dinosaurs.   I'm told that there are still people who believe that the moon landing never took place. 
 
You cannot expect those of us who advocate for a fairer and more efficient legal system to take all of the blame for the educational failings of the rest of America. 
 
Mr. Rosenbaum suggests that my "side is of course reluctant to debunk such theories."  Rubbish.  I just did debunk these fake cases.  I published the link to the Snopes.com article that the original Enid letter failed to cite.  It takes about 10 seconds with a web search engine to learn that these six cases are fake.
 
Mr. Rosenbaum says that I should have addressed "why the substantive points of the article were incorrect." 
 
Frankly, I thought I did.  On further review, however, I can see that the original letter mentions a number of reports that suggest that "tort reform" did not result in a decrease in insurance premiums. 
 
First, the question of whether changes in the law result in changes in insurance premiums is a complex question.  There is no such thing as "tort reform" per se.  Rather, the tort reform community consists of a number of advocates who propound various proposals for improving the law.  Not all of these advocates agree.  Various states have tried various measures to improve their legal systems, but to lump all of these proposals together and call them "tort reform" does not do justice to the multiplicity of changes states have considered or reformers have suggested. 
 
Second, in those states that have adopted some kind of legal change to reduce the incidence of litigation, the results are somewhat mixed on the impact on insurance rates.  Unfortunately, this topic is itself quite complicated, and cannot be addressed easily here.  Consider this background piece by Jim Copland on the problem of dealing with insurance statistics and accept the conclusion that the jury is still out on how insurance rates correspond with changes in litigation procedure. 
 
Third, and most importantly, however, is that the relationship between legal reform and insurance rates is only one small facet of the argument for reform.  Litigation in the U.S. consumes approximately $300 billion every year.  This drain out of our economy equates to nearly $1,000 per person.  I outline the economic impacts of excessive litigation in my book, Out of Balance: Prescriptions for Reforming the American Litigation System.
 
If legal reform succeeds in reducing this economic drain, I really wouldn't care if it affected insurance rates too.  Consequently, you aren't persuasive if you argue that reform is worthless if even you did prove that insurance rates would be unchanged.
 
Mr. Rosenbaum cannot avoid stooping to an ad hominem attack, asking me how much I'm getting paid for my website by "insurance corporations."
 
Sadly, I must confess that I have not been paid a penny by the insurance industry, or any other industry for that matter, for my website, my book, or anything else I've written.  (Memo to industry representatives: If you'd like to pay me, you know where to find me).  Unfortunately, however, Mr. Rosenbaum has no one to blame for my opinions but me.
 
His last barb is my favorite, asking me to "explain to a single mother why the value of her limbs, were they to be amputated through an unfortunate course of negligent events, would only be worth $250,000".
 
Presumably the point behind this non sequitur is to draw me into defending caps on damage claims.  Mr. Rosenbaum does this, even though the original Enid letter made no mention of damage caps, because it personalizes the problem of litigation procedure for individuals.  This is a frequent technique used by trial lawyers because it takes the focus of the argument away from the larger societal problem (the economic impact of litigation) and places it on the sympathies the audience has for an injured individual.
 
Nice try, Al.
 
While caps on damage claims are one kind of "tort reform" they are not all there is to it.  For myself, I think that caps on damages are not the most effective way of reducing the overall impact of litigation.  I favor procedural changes that shift the cost of litigation onto those who pursue weak claims or who make demands that exceed the value of their claims.
 
So put your guns back in their holsters, Mr. Rosenbaum. 
8:43 am est

Friday, June 10, 2005

Pryor Confirmed to 11th Circuit
Pryor was placed on the 11th circuit bench in a 2004 recess appointment after his nomination was filibustered by Senate Democrats. 
 
His nomination was one of three agreed upon in the "gang of 14" agreement to avoid a Senate rules change that would have eliminated the filibuster in debates over judicial appointments. 
9:18 am est

Thursday, June 9, 2005

Look for Me on PointOfLaw
Jim Copland and Walter Olson have graciously invited me to contribute to the Manhattan Institute blog on PointOfLaw.com.  I look forward to writing from this new vantage point in addition to my personal site here. 
12:49 pm est

The Facts on William Pryor
According to the Birmingham News:
There's the Bill Pryor Alabamians know.
 
Then there's the Bill Pryor portrayed by liberal special-interest groups.
 
One is smart and level-headed, who holds great respect for the rule of law. As Alabama attorney general, he demonstrated great courage by standing up to the state's biggest demagogue since George Wallace, in the form of former Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore.
 
The other, according to some civil rights, environmental and pro-choice groups, among others, would roll back individual rights and use a federal judgeship to espouse his extreme political and ideological beliefs.
 
"It is very hard to reconcile the two points of view," Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., said.
 
Actually, it's not. All Feinstein and other Senate Democrats have to do is quit relying on the distorted information of the liberal special-interest groups fighting Pryor's judicial nomination and talk to some Alabama Democrats.
Those Alabama Democrats include Representative Artur Davis, a black Democrat elected to Congress in 2002, who gave Pryor a "ringing endorsement"  and the chairman of the Alabama Democratic Conference, Dr. Joe Reed, who called Pryor a "first-class public official" who "will be a credit to the judiciary and will be a guardian for justice."
 
An article in the April 10, 2003 Mobile Register also claims that Pryor has been praised by former Alabama Supreme Court Justice Terry Butts (a Democrat) and former Democratic Alabama Attorney General Bill Baxley.
 
When Pryor's appointment was filibustered by Senate Democrats in 2003 he was given a recess appointment by President Bush to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.   Pryor's pending nomination would make that appointment permanent. 
 
These plaudits from his home state opponents haven't softened the criticism of the usual chorus of left-wing groups from the People for the American Way (who called him "unfit to judge") to SaveOurCourts.org ("extremist agenda"). 
 
Intellectually honest liberals, however, like GWU law professor Jonathan Turley, concede that Pryor is well qualified.  In a recent interview, Turley describes his personal knowledge of Pryor and Pryor's performance in following the law, even when it conflicted with his personal beliefs:
Well, I actually know Pryor. Back when we were — we both clerked on the 5th Circuit for different judges. And back then he was known as sharp as a whip.
 
We weren't close back then, but he was well known even then as being a real bright light. And I think he's gotten a raw deal, quite frankly.
 
He's very conservative, there's no question about it. But I think it was very telling that he believes very strongly that the Ten Commandments can be shown in a monument or in a display. And yet, when there was that confrontation with Chief Justice Moore in Alabama, he carried out his duties.
 
He prosecuted Moore, even though he agreed with Moore. And so with Pryor, I think that he's gotten a uniquely raw deal, because he's proven that even against his own views, he will carry out the law.
Ultimately, Turley concluded that there was no principled reason for Democrats not to confirm Pryor. 
7:09 am est

Janice Rogers Brown Confirmed
As expected, the Senate confirmed Janice Rogers Brown yesterday to a spot on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
Next up: Former Alabama Attorney General William Pryor. 
6:34 am est

Wednesday, June 8, 2005

Just Released: Out of Balance: Prescriptions for Reforming the American Litigation System
I'm happy to announce that the publisher has released Out of Balance.  You can buy copies through the publisher's website here.
 
In the next few weeks, the book will become available through Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble, Ingram's and other resellers. 
 
The book recounts the problem of excessive litigation in America